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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co.1 effectively overrules Loescher v.
2
Parr
in a dramatic and largely unexplained philosophical about-face
by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
A workman using a long, metal-handled rake to groove a justpoured concrete roadway touched the handle to an overhead highvoltage electric line and suffered severe injuries, for which the jury
unanimously found Gulf States liable. The court of appeal found that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk and that the jury was "clearly
wrong" in finding otherwise.' The supreme court found Gulf States
to be nonnegligent, without mentioning whether the jury was "clearly wrong," and affirmed the court of appeal.
Loescher is effectively overruled because Kent now requires proof
of a defendant's failure to use reasonable care4 in order to support
a finding of his liability for injury created by a defective thing under
his control. Loescher had specifically dispensed with any requirement
that the plaintiff prove personal negligence on the part of the
defendant.
This philosophical about-face is left unexplained. The only reason
given in the opinion for this drastic revision of the burden of proof
under Loescher is that the meaning of Loescher has been
"misunderstood." There is no discussion in Kent of the societal values
sought to be served by turning to negligence for the foundation of
the action under Civil Code articles 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, and
2322. In sharp contrast, Turner v. Bucher,5 Holland v. Buckley," and
Loescher each explicitly stated that its theory of liability was chosen
to balance the interest of an innocent injured party against the custodian whose thing, child, or animal caused the injury through an
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1. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
2. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
3. 398 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), aff'd 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
4. It is not clear from the opinion whether the defendant's failure to use care
is an.element of the plaintiffs burden of proof in making a prima facie case, or whether
the defendant's failure to use care is presumed, allowing the defendant to make out
a defense by proving due care.
5. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
6. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
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unreasonable risk of harm, while the custodian enjoyed the benefits
of the thing.
The sole reason given in Kent for the reinterpretation of Loescher
is that the case "has largely been either misunderstood or completely
disregarded." 7 The opinion cites no examples or cases of the
misunderstanding or disregard. One who has followed closely the evolution of the Loescher action through the Louisiana Supreme Court and
the courts of appeal could reasonably regard the jurisprudence thus
developed as following closely the scheme laid down in Loescher. The
only aberrations or missteps have been well within the parameters
of the lurching and rumbling ordinarily attendant upon the courts'
application of new legal doctrine to specific cases.
To illustrate, numerous cases have correctly focused on the fact
that a flaw or vice may be present in a thing such as a street, and
yet the flaw or vice, even though causing injury, does not constitute
an unreasonable risk of harm.8 The courts of appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court have demonstrated fully that they are masters
of the technique of utilizing the Loescher doctrine of strict liability,
while showing sufficient flexibility to differentiate among defects that
cause harm but do not carry strict liability, as opposed to those which
in the sound judgment of the court constitute too much risk for society to tolerate. The mind of the juror or judge assessing the
unreasonable risk of harm presented by a thing exercises precisely
the same value judgments as does the juror or judge evaluating a
defendant's personal conduct to determine if an unreasonable risk has
been created under ordinary negligence theory. The important difference in the original Loescher theory is that the plaintiff need only
prove the unreasonable risk presented by the thing, without having
to prove that the conduct of the custodian in allowing the thing to
get into that shape was also unreasonable. The essence of the Loescher
doctrine, overlooked in DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance
Co.,9 is that the flexibility of a balancing process is available to the
courts in the examination of the unreasonableness of the risk presented
by the thing, just as it is in an examination of the unreasonableness
of conduct.
The practical effect of the Kent version of Loescher is to make
7. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497.
8. The following cases found no "unreasonable risk:" Broussard v. Pennsylvania
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 574 (La. 1981); Miller v. Smith, 402 So. 2d 688 (La.
1981); Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981); Walker v. James W.
Salley, Inc., 412 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Goodlow v. City of Alexandria,
407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Usry v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 402
So. 2d 240 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
9. 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
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recovery by the plaintiff less frequent. The plaintiff now has the
burden of showing not only that the condition of the thing posed an
unreasonable risk, but that there was also a failure to take reasonable
care to prevent its getting into that condition and causing injury. Concomitantly, the defendant is given the powerful defense of showing
that even though the thing presented an unreasonable risk, he exercised reasonable care and hence should suffer no liability.
The introduction of the concept of reasonable care is far more
than mere tinkering with legal theory. Tort theory is without purpose except for its effect on the compensation of injury. Compensation must be adjudicated in the adversary process of litigation. The
increasing or diminishing of the defendant's or the plaintiff's burden
of proof often has more effect on the compensation of a given injury
than does the statement of the legal theory itself. For instance, if
the facts in Loescher were to be adjudicated now under the Kent standard, the plaintiff, under an increased burden of proof not present
when Loescher was written, could lose because of a finding that his
evidence of the defendant's lack of care is inadequate, or the court
or the jury might find that the defendant's showing of due care carried his burden on that issue even if the plaintiff originally had made
a prima facie showing on the same point. Specifically, under Kent,
had the owner of the magnolia tree in Loescher shown that a tree
surgeon examined the magnolia and advised him that there was no
danger of the tree's falling, that would be a sufficient offering of
evidence of due care to put to the jury the question of whether the
defendant had taken "reasonable steps" to prevent injury from the
decayed condition (unreasonable risk) of the tree.
The foregoing problem in the Kent version of Loescher is deeper
than it first appears. The Kent theory of liability is logically impossible to apply if "traditional notions of blameworthiness" are preserved. The opinion includes the following summary of the court's interpretation of Loescher:
Accordingly, in a strict liability case in which the claimant
asserts that the owner's damage-causing thing presented an
unreasonable risk of harm, the standardfor determining liability
is to presume the owner's knowledge of the risk presented by
the thing under his control and then to determine the
reasonableness (according to traditional notions of blameworthiness) of the owner's conduct, in the light of that presumed
knowledge."0
Assuming that the phrase "according to traditional notions of

10.

418 So. 2d at 497. (emphasis in original).
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blameworthiness" refers to the theory of negligence as conventionally stated, it is practically and theoretically impossible to have
reasonable conduct creating an unreasonable risk.
One of the original and definitive writings on the concept of
negligence defines negligence in the following manner: "Negligence
is conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing
damage. Due care is conduct which does not involve such a risk."1
The same article later states a corollary to this definition: "The
test of reasonableness is what would be the conduct or judgment of
what may be called a standard man in the situation of the person
whose conduct is in question .... Anything that a standard man would
do is reasonable." 2
It follows from the quoted analysis that under
conventional negligence theory, it is impossible to say that reasonable
conduct created an unreasonable risk, for it is the risk that gives
character to the conduct; hence, it is a complete departure from traditional notions of negligence to say that the tree in Loescher presented
an unreasonable risk of harm, but that the judge or jury could find
the conduct that created the unreasonable risk to be reasonable. Conversely, if conduct is found to be reasonable, the risk, by definition,
cannot be unreasonable. Therefore, Kent introduces a totally novel
theory of liability, departing even from traditional concepts of
negligence.
Under the Kent theory, what criteria can be used to assess the
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct? Throughout the legal
treatises and analyses on the subject, there is but one criterion: i.e.,
whether or not the conduct created an unreasonable risk. 3 This goes
to the very nature of negligence. If the Kent double incident of
assessable reasonableness (the defendant's conduct and the condition
of the thing) is to be maintained, then the court must give the bench
and bar new criteria for determining the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct in light of factors other than the nature of the risk
created, for the traditional criterion has been stricken.
Whatever may be the societal objective of Kent, it should have
been achieved within the Civil Code, rather than within the still unsolved mysteries ,of the fictions of the common law of negligence,
burdened as it is with its evolutionary history of the writ-thinking
English courts. Professor Prosser assesses that character of common
law torts in express terms:
The shadow of the past still lies rather heavily on the law of
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1915).
Id. at 47.
See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS S 16.1 (1956); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965); Terry, supra note 11.
11.
12.
13.
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torts. When the common law first emerged, its forms of procedure
were rigidly prescribed, and the plaintiff could have, no cause of
action unless he could fit his claim into the form of some existing
and recognized writ. These "forms of action we have buried, but
they still rule us from their graves." 4
...The

fundamental basis of tort liability may first be divided
into three parts - not because that number is traditional, but
because every case in which liability has been imposed has rested
upon one of three, and only three, grounds for imposing it. These
are:
1.
Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiffs
interest.
2.
Negligence.
3.
Strict liability, "without fault," where the defendant is held
liable in the absence of any intent which the law finds
wrongful, or any negligence, very often for reasons of
policy."5
The peril of interpreting the Civil Code by application of common law
theories is illustrated in Kent by the pointless presumption of
knowledge of the risk to establish scienter. The element of fault under
the Civil Code is the parallel of scienter in the common law and, as
manifested in the Loescher concept, is found in the custodianship of
the thing afflicted with a condition presenting an unreasonable risk
of harm. Loescher is clear in that it is this relationship and the enjoyment of the benefits from the thing, along with the failure to prevent
the thing from being an unreasonable risk, that constitutes fault. It
is unnecessary to reach into common law history, with its endless fictions, to form a structure of presumptions and foresight that would
result in fault through knowledge of the risk. The Civil Code provides that fault flows from the custodial relationship, as clearly explained in Loescher. It is therefore simple misdirection to establish
scienter, when the Civil Code relies on fault and provides fully for
establishing it in a given case.
The Kent majority and concurring opinions express a longing for
a return to the principles of negligence in order to utilize the flexibility that is built into that notion. That flexibility already is built
into the Loescher theory in the concept of "unreasonable risk." In
negligence, flexibility is found in the elements of the balancing process: i.e., gravity of harm, likelihood of harm, utility of the act, and
burden of prevention. The same flexible balancing process is used to
determine whether a thing presents an unreasonable risk. The Loui14.
15.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (4th ed. 1971).
W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 26-27 (emphasis added).
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siana Supreme Court has demonstrated a clear awareness of this flexibility in Hunt v. City Stores, Inc."s The Loescher theory, properly applied, allows the court all the flexibility it needs for finding liability
in one activity, but not in another, although the two activities are
very similar. The finely tuned conscience of the court, seeking to
allocate the risk of injury, has a fully adequate mechanism in Loescher.
The Kent approach, by returning to the morass of common law
negligence, will only hamper the court's implementation of societal
values.
16. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).

